BUILDING BACK ACEH BETTER THROUGH
RECONSTRUCTION AND REINTEGRATION
A JOINT PEACE-KEEPING EFFORT

Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, Ricky Sugiarto
Tokyo, 8 August 2007
NATURAL DISASTER AND LONG-LASTING CONFLICT IN ACEH REQUIRE A JOINT EFFORT OF RECONSTRUCTION AND REINTEGRATION

Recovering from tsunami... ...promoting co-existence

A Joint Peace-Keeping Effort
OVERLAP BETWEEN CONFLICT AND TSUNAMI AFFECTED AREAS MAKES THE RECOVERY EFFORTS INSEPARABLE

Source: Author
NATURAL DISASTER AND LONG-LASTING CONFLICT IN ACEH REQUIRE A JOINT EFFORT OF RECONSTRUCTION AND REINTEGRATION

Recovering from tsunami…

…promoting co-existence

A Joint Peace-Keeping Effort
TSUNAMI RESULTED UNPRECEDEDENT DAMAGE ALONG THE REGION OF ACEH

800 km x 1-6 km destroyed!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damage assessment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,000 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish ponds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students lost their schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers died</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, BRR
During emergency relief, great supports from both national and international enabled the effort to be very successful.

Biggest non-military operation in the last 50 years

Not a single fatal case of disease or starvation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National support</th>
<th>International support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteers 5,465</td>
<td>Countries 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical team 124</td>
<td>Personnel 16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramedical personnel 11,800</td>
<td>Medical team 117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy equipments 493</td>
<td>Mother ship 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel 6,000</td>
<td>Floating hospital 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War ship 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Helicopter 82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, BRR
BRR COORDINATES ALL RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT AND IMPLEMENT GOVERNMENT BUDGET

Establishment of the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) Aceh and Nias*

- Established 16 April 2006 through Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2005 and strengthened by Law No. 10/2005
- BRR has three governing bodies:
  – Advisory Board
  – Supervisory Board
  – Executing Agency

EXECUTING AGENCY OF BRR – THE MISSION

- Restore livelihoods and strengthen communities
  – Coordinated
  – Community-driven
  – Highest professional standards
- Facilitate and coordinate all players
  – Government
  – Local, national, and international institutions
- Coordinate and implement government projects

…we will rebuild Aceh and Nias. And we will rebuild it back better.”

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
The President of Republic of Indonesia

* Nias is included as result of the 8.7 Richter scale earthquake in March 28, 2005
Source: Author, BRR
UP TO NOW, BRR COORDINATES MORE THAN ~12,500 PROJECTS AND IMPLEMENTS ~5000 PROJECTS

Implement & coordinate
- Government budget
  - ~5000 projects

Coordinate
- Donor ~ 40 countries
  - ~1500 projects
- NGO ~ 600 organizations
  - ~6000 projects

Reconstruction actors
- Local govt (dinas)
- NGOs
- Contractor
- Supplier
- Consultant

Source: Author, BRR
CHALLENGES IN DELIVERING REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ACEH AND NIAS (1/2)

Challenges

Scale of work
• Wide geography covered
  – December 2004 tsunami affected 800 kms of coastal area with depth up to 6 kms in-land
  – March 2005 earthquake affected the whole area in Nias islands
• Big value of reconstruction
  – Needs valued at USD 8.5b
  – Committed fund at USD 6.1b
• Huge project management involving ~12,000 projects

Law and regulation
• Emergency-state recovery requires non-normal-state regulations to ensure high pace delivery
• This historically unprecedented disaster created situations that are not stipulated in existing regulations

Limited local capacity
• 30 years of isolation due to conflict, combined with losses from disaster, demands significant development of the region’s overall capacity
• Value of reconstruction has absorbed all remaining local capacity/resources – forcing the need to import additional capacity/resources from outside, both elsewhere in Indonesia and beyond

Source: Author
CHALLENGES IN DELIVERING REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ACEH AND NIAS (2/2)

Challenges

Multiple stakeholders

• Various stakeholders in local, national, and international level
  – Fragmented community/beneficiaries burdened by the impact of conflict and low level of trust
  – Government
  – Donor countries, i.e., both bilateral and multilateral
  – Reconstruction NGOs – A new dynamic that an NGO is even bigger than any donor, i.e., IFRC
  – Other NGOs, e.g., anti-corruption watchdogs
  – Reconstruction actors, i.e., contractor, supplier, consultant
  – Media/press

Dynamic environment

• Efforts on reconstruction have to walk side-by-side with post conflict reintegration
• BRR must evolve quickly during its 4-years mission from set up, consolidate, implement, then phase out – All while maintain very high demands and expectations to deliver results at high pace
• Frequent change of situation due to various interests that come into one play, i.e., technically, politically, socially, andlogistically

Source: Author
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS BEEN VERY GENEROUS, HOWEVER ACEH AND NIAS NEED FURTHER SUPPORT IN ORDER TO “BUILD BACK BETTER”

Total Fund
USD Billion

- Damage assessment: 4.9
- Build back: 7.1
- Build back better: 8.5
- Pledged: 7.2
- Committed: 6.4

Total gap of USD 2.1 Billion

Committed 89%
OUT OF THE TOTAL OF USD 6 BILLION, MOST FUNDING COMES FROM OFF BUDGET SOURCES

Total commitment
100% = USD 6.1 Billion

- Govt of Indonesia: 37%
- NGO: 36%
- Bilateral & Multilateral donor: 27%

Off budget amounts for 63%!

Examples

- Hospital in Calang, Spain
- Meulaboh seaport, Singapore
- Housing in Lampuuk, Turkey
- Calang-Meulaboh road, Japan

Source: Author, BRR
FOCUS OF THE RECONSTRUCTION SHIFTS ALONG THE PERIOD OF 2005-2009 WHEN BRR COMPLETES ITS MANDATE

Source: Author, BRR
### TWO YEARS AFTER, THE PROGRESS IS VERY ENCOURAGING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs</th>
<th>Needs</th>
<th>Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New houses</strong></td>
<td>120,000 unit</td>
<td>41,734 Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agricultural land</strong></td>
<td>60,000 ha</td>
<td>37,926 ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Road</strong></td>
<td>3,000 km</td>
<td>490 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seaports</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Airports/airstrips</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teachers</strong></td>
<td>2,500 died</td>
<td>2,430 trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Schools</strong></td>
<td>2,006 unit</td>
<td>524 unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health facilities</strong></td>
<td>127 unit</td>
<td>113 unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, BRR
## BREAKTHROUGH INITIATIVES ARE TAKEN TO ACCELERATE AND BUILD BACK BETTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fast track project approval</th>
<th>Integrated team (tim terpadu)</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| • Acceleration in very early stage of the reconstruction by conducting the fast track project approval workshops | • Unit under BRR representing and exercising authority of various government institutions that acts as a “one stop shop”  
  – Tax exemption processing  
  – Import document processing  
  – Visa/work permit, etc. |
| • Project concept note as documentation of all off-budget projects, i.e., proposal, monitoring, progress report, etc. |                                                                                             |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRR trust fund mechanism</th>
<th>Gender policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • On-budget funding mechanism for multi-years projects that enables continuous progress across government budget calendar | • Implementation of joint land-titling – first in the country  
  • Gender equality mainstreaming in all development sectors |

Source: Author, BRR
BRR HAS ITS HEADQUARTER IN BANDA ACEH AND SIX REGIONAL OFFICES TO STRENGTHEN ITS EFFECTIVENESS

Area of the regional offices

1. Sabang, Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar & Aceh Jaya
2. Pidie, Bireuen, Lhok Seumawe & Aceh Utara
3. Bener Meriah, Aceh Tengah, Gayo Lues, Aceh Timur, Langsa & Aceh Tamiang
4. Aceh Barat, Nagan Raya, ABDYA & Simeuleu
5. Aceh Selatan, Aceh Tenggara & Aceh Singkil
6. Nias

The six regional offices are also supported by 15 district offices

Source: Author, BRR
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IS ENCOURAGED AND APPLIED IN THE OVERALL RECONSTRUCTION

Village planning as one of the community driven approach applications

Source: Author, BRR
ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY IS UPHELD AT THE UTMOST AS THE FOUNDATION OF TRUST FROM ALL STAKEHOLDERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRR Integrity Pact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• BRR applies the integrity pact to all staffs, not only procurement related ones, and all its projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-corruption unit (SAK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• BRR is the first government agency to have an autonomous and independent anti-corruption unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• At BRR request, KPK established its first representative office outside Jakarta in Banda Aceh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPPN-K office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• BRR is the only government agency in Indonesian history to have a dedicated KPPN (national treasury) representative office</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervisory Board and Advisory Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• BRR ensures its effectiveness through the existence of autonomous Supervisory and Advisory Boards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author, BRR
1. A single agency with full authority is essential to clear every obstacle and do everything required to deliver an effective reconstruction program.

2. The agency must have the authority to coordinate donor programs and the means to implement programs in its own right. In doing so, the agency must focus on filling gaps, not competing with delivery partners.

3. Supporting state regulations must grant authority for the agency to move quickly by, for example, directly appointing contractors to short-circuit long procurement processes.

4. The agency must be flexible and responsive, not rigid and bureaucratic; it must adapt to changing circumstances and requirements.

5. The agency must establish and maintain the trust of all stakeholders through transparency, accountability and the highest professional standards.

Source: Author
6. Emergency reconstruction requires parallel (not sequential) processes to move fast. The risks of overlap and poor cohesion need to be managed.

7. Layers of bureaucracy, especially of institutions headquartered outside the project area, must be minimized by delegating authority to local representatives for greater relevance, speed & effectiveness in decision making and implementation.

8. Flag-waving by reconstruction players must be minimized to avoid unproductive competition and, worse, possible rejection by local communities.

9. Breakthrough initiatives should be identified and promoted to become part of standard state practice elsewhere in the public sector.

10. Developing local capacity is essential to ensure sustainability.

Source: Author
NATURAL DISASTER AND LONG-LASTING CONFLICT IN ACEH DEMAND A JOINT EFFORT OF RECONSTRUCTION AND REINTEGRATION

Recovering from tsunami…

…promoting co-existence

A Joint Peace-Keeping Effort
FOUR ASPECTS BEHIND THIRTY YEARS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND FREE ACEH MOVEMENT (GAM)

Centralism & economic exploitation

Local aspiration of independence

Local corruption

Military operations & politics of impunity

Source: Author, Rizal Sukma
CONFLICT IN ACEH AND ITS PEACE EFFORTS FROM 1970s TO 2005

30 years of conflict

June 2000 - Jan 2001

Humanitarian Pause

COHA

Dec 2002 - May 2003

Martial Law

Dec 2004

Dec 2004

Tsunami

Helsinki Peace MoU

August 2005 onwards

Peace accord

• Joint agreement on Humanitarian Pause (JAHP)

• Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA)

• Helsinki Peace MoU

Mediator

• Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC*)

• Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC*)

• Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)

*M: Previously named Henry Dunant Centre
THE IMPACT OF HUMANITARIAN PAUSE AND COHA WAS POSITIVE DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD BUT NOT SUSTAINABLE

Why it failed...

Humanitarian Pause

• Fundamental political issues were not touched
• Points of agreement could be interpreted in different ways
• Monitoring team’s competence was low and findings were not published

COHA

• Security, humanitarian aid, infrastructure reconstruction, and civilian reforms were discussed, but not the political end-state of Aceh
• Implementation schedule was not detailed, except for demilitarization
• Government policy conflicted with the agreement
• Monitoring was weak, security of witness was not guaranteed, findings were not followed up well

Source: Author, Thamrin Ananda

KEY LEARNINGS

• Agreement has to be developed to resolve the root issue which is the political end-state of Aceh, not only ceasefire and demilitarization

• Trust-based relationship is the only way to have a dialogue

• Mediator has to be able to influence government policy implementation

• Monitoring agent has to have the authority to act against violations
HOWEVER, AS TSUNAMI STRUCK ACEH, MANY BELIEVED THAT IT WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESSING PEACE

“…tsunami produced an overwhelming moral, political, economic, and social imperative to end the conflict.”

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
The President of Republic Indonesia

“…the President Yudhoyono and the leaders of Free Aceh Movement turned the tragedy of the tsunami into an opportunity – an opportunity to build peace in Aceh.”

Kofi Annan
The Secretary General of United Nations

Source: Speech script of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Kofi Annan
HAVING LEARNED FROM THE PAST EXPERIENCE, HELSINKI NEGOTIATIONS TOOK OFF DIFFERENTLY

Key differences

- First agree on the core issue whether Aceh should be independent or stay part of Indonesia
- Comprehensive peace settlement
  - Agree on political relationship between Aceh and Indonesian state, not only security matters
  - Reflects a compromise
  - Creative

Helsinki MoU

- Governing of Aceh
  - Law on the Governing of Aceh (UU PA)
  - Political participation
  - Economy
  - Rule of law
- Human rights
- Amnesty and reintegration into society
- Security arrangements
- Establishment of AMM
- Dispute settlement

Immediate actions

- Granting amnesty to GAM members and political prisoners (30 Aug 2005)
- Establishment of Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) (Sept 2005)
- GAM undertook the decommissioning of armaments & demobilization of troops (Sept-Dec 2005)
- GoI withdrew non-organic military and police forces (until Dec 2005)
- Promulgation of law on governing of Aceh (July 2006)

Source: Author, CMI, Edward Aspinal, Rizal Sukma
INTERSECTION OF THE POLITICAL AND THE PRACTICAL PROVIDES INCOMPLETE VIEW ON HOW HELSINKI NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEEDED

Tsunami

Tsunami forced both parties to reconsider their position and take advantage of significant international assistance to respond to the crisis

SBY/Kalla factor

Investment of time, energy, and political capital of the President SBY and Vice President Jusuf Kalla since long before the formal Helsinki process

Conventional wisdoms on the success of Helsinki negotiations

Military operations launched by TNI when COHA collapsed had significant impact on political presence, systems of financing, and military capacities of GAM

TNI factor

Source: Author, Michael Morfit
JOINT EFFORTS OF GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA AND GAM AS KEY SUCCESS FACTORS OF HELSINKI NEGOTIATIONS

RI

5
Risking political capital for a common vision

6
Solid team of SBY-Kalla

7
Bringing TNI on board

GAM

1
Establishing clear framework

2
Good will to leverage the facilitator

3
Working out of channels

4
Characteristically Indonesian/Aceh process

8
Willingness to put trust (again)

9
Justice and welfare of Aceh as basis for all

10
One command of negotiation table and the field

Source: Author, Teuku Kamaruzzaman, Michael Morfit

RI = Republic of Indonesia
GAM = Free Aceh Movement
KEY SUCCESS FACTORS OF HELSINKI NEGOTIATIONS (1/3)

1. Establishing clear framework
   - GoI: SBY established the framework to orient, direct, and coordinate
     - The principle of the **territorial integrity** of the Indonesian state (NKRI)
     - Consistency with and in the framework of the **Indonesian constitution**
   - GAM: **Independence is no longer the ultimate aspiration**, but more on political authorities, welfare, and justice

2. Good will to leverage the facilitator
   - Both parties had their good will to provide **sufficient authorities to the facilitators** to be able to take necessary action or intervention

3. Working out of channels
   - GoI: SBY-Kalla **pulled the negotiation team not through formal bureaucracy**
     - Members selected based on personal qualities rather than formal positions
     - No Javanese to avoid sensitivity of aversion to “Javanese colonization”
   - GAM: **Communication with GoI** to share its views of peace conducted even from the jail*

4. Characteristically Indonesian process
   - Informal & highly **personal contacts**, use of **intermediaries, personal networks**
   - **Behind the scene** negotiations
   - **Ad hoc** **trial-and-error approaches**

* To be detailed out in the next slide

Source: Author, Teuku Kamaruzzaman, Michael Morfit
PASSPORT OF KAMARUZZAMAN (BRR SECRETARY) AS A SILENT PROOF OF COOPERATION BETWEEN GOI AND GAM

Passport issued in Bandung, addressed at the prison

Dated July 2005 (before the MoU)

Profession of the negotiator is said to be “farmer”

Source: Author, Teuku Kamaruzzaman
KEY SUCCESS FACTORS OF HELSINKI NEGOTIATIONS (2/3)

5. Risking political capital for a common vision

“I strongly believe that a military solution could not solve the problem permanently and conclusively” – SBY

“In our history, resolving problems must always be achieved through dialogue” – Jusuf Kalla

6. Solid team of SBY-Kalla

• SBY played the role as setting the objective and developing the broad strategy, taking into account the interest of three stakeholder groups:
  – Local community
  – National constituencies
  – International community

• Kalla had the responsibility for overseeing and managing the Helsinki negotiations on day-to-day basis

7. Bringing TNI on board

• SBY made a strategic movement by recalling the letter of nomination and instead proposed keeping the incumbent TNI Commander-in-Chief as SBY trusted him as able to look at wider picture and supporter of peace process

• Later SBY asked the TNI Commander-in-Chief to help pull TNI into line with government policies

Description

Source: Michael Morfit
### Description

**8. Willingness to put trust again**

- Even after several failed efforts, GAM had strong belief that negotiation was the way to reach its goal.
- The fact that SBY Cabinet had international trust was taken by GAM as an indication that they should put their trust too.

**9. Justice and welfare of Aceh as basis for all**

- Along the negotiations, GAM showed that its intention was not towards GAM’s political power, wealth for GAM, etc, but justice and welfare of the people of Aceh.

**10. One command of negotiation table and the field**

- All parts of GAM, the political leaders abroad and the field commanders, demonstrated a very discipline command of one voice and aligned actions.
LESSONS FROM ACEH CAN POTENTIALLY BE APPLIED IN OTHER PEACE EFFORTS

1. Role of **third party facilitation** is pivotal

2. Peace deal is made possible by the new thinking within the Government of Indonesia which **no longer** defines the question of **state sovereignty** in a rigid way

3. Parties to the conflict should **focus on peace incentives**, **confidence**, and **trust-building** first, rather than on cases of human rights abuses

4. The **openness to outside participation** in the implementation process would greatly strengthen the commitment of both parties to comply with the terms of agreement

5. **Political support** at national level is imperative

6. **Unified command** structures on both sides are essential if the parties are to deliver on their commitments

Source: Rizal Sukma
LAW ON GOVERNING OF ACEH PROVIDES GREATER AUTONOMY TO ENHANCE ACEH DEVELOPMENT AND ITS PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT

Human security
• Freedom from fear
• Freedom from want

Political reconciliation
• Establishment of local political parties
• Election of Governor, district chiefs, and mayors

Economic reconstruction
• Special Autonomy Fund for 20 years
• Management of oil and gas to be done jointly by provincial and central government
• General Allocation Fund on infrastructure, education, health, & poverty for 15 years

Social unity
• Implementation of Sharia Law as social bond
• Supported by human security, economic reconstruction, and political reconciliation

Source: Law No.11/2006, Theo L. Sambuaga
THROUGH SUCCESSFUL LOCAL ELECTION, PEOPLE OF ACEH HAVE CHOSEN LEGITIMATE GOVERNOR AND MAYORS ACROSS THE PROVINCE

Election conducted at the provincial and 19 district/municipality levels

1st time that this many elections simultaneously done in a province

Key actors/entities

• Independent Election Commission (KIP)
  – Supported by UNDP Aceh Local Elections Support (ALES)
  – KIP (local election) media center
• Election Supervisory Body (Panwaslih)
• Aceh Local Election Working Group
• Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)
• International monitoring team
  – European Union
  – Asian Network For Free Elections (Anfrel)
  – Local Government Support Programme (LGSP)
  – United State for Agency International Devolopment (USAID)
  – Australian Electoral Commision
• Local/national monitoring team
  – People’s Voter Education Network (JPPR)
  – Acehnese local NGOs
  – Aceh International Recovery Program
  – Independent Monitoring Committee for Election (KIPP)

Results

“Competitive, transparent and well administered elections with Acehnese freely electing their leaders contribute to the consolidation of peace and democracy in Aceh”

European Union Election Observation Mission

• Independent candidate (non-political party affiliation) for Governor and Vice Governor won the election

• Election process of the 19 mayors was also done in a relatively smooth process

Source: Author
BRA WAS ESTABLISHED TO IMPLEMENT REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS HOWEVER ITS EFFECTIVENESS WAS LIMITED

Aceh Reintegration Agency (BRA)

• Established by the acting Governor of Aceh

• Objective: to facilitate the reintegration of former GAM combatants and civilians who participated in GAM activities into normal society

• Consist the representatives of:
  – Provincial government
  – Former GAM
  – Intellectual figures
  – Religious leaders
  – NGOs
  – Former militias

BRA situation

• BRA faces limited capacity so that implementation of its programs is a challenge

• BRA programs are perceived to emphasize the distribution of reintegration funds, leaving the fundamental community development program behind

• GAM representatives pulled out from BRA and stated that the agency was too bureaucratic

• As a direct result, BRA experienced significant decrease of budget:
  – 2006: Rp ~750 Billion
  – 2007: Rp ~250 Billion

Source: Author, Aleksius Jemadu
CHALLENGES FACING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MoU AND PEACE IN GENERAL

1. Uncertain implementation of the remaining set of the MoU

2. Potential different interpretation of the political agreement embodied in the MoU

3. Potential spoilers from both sides who could undermine the agreement, e.g., future local/national legislation might gradually erode key features of the accord

4. Turbulence of the local political people who force their own interest

5. Corruption and lack of government capacity might prevent local community from benefiting from the anticipated peace dividend

Source: Author, Edward Aspinal
NEXT STEPS FORWARD TO MAINTAIN PEACE

1. Ensure livelihood recovery and social security of former GAM population in the context of overall economic development of Aceh

2. GAM (Free Aceh Movement) has to ensure smooth shift of orientation of the organization, i.e., establishment of GAM-affiliated political party

3. Alignment of the aspirations of former GAM with their realization by the newly elected local government

4. Handle cases of alleged violations of the MoU seriously and enhance quality of local law enforcement to promote fairness and justice

5. Maintain regular communication at the high level between the two parties

6. Demonstrate public political education, e.g., role model from the local leaders

7. Promote equal representation of women and men in all aspects above

Source: Author, Mustafa Abubakar
NATURAL DISASTER AND LONG-LASTING CONFLICT IN ACEH REQUIRE A JOINT EFFORT OF RECONSTRUCTION AND REINTEGRATION

Recovering from tsunami… …promoting co-existence

A Joint Peace-Keeping Effort
During the tsunami emergency relief, there were concerns about opening Aceh to external intrusions during a period of martial law.

Three months after tsunami, all “irrelevant” international parties were urged to leave Aceh:
- Suspicion towards the activities of the international agencies
- Radical Islamic groups were worried that the presence of the non-moslem agencies could weaken the Islamic credentials of Aceh

Questions raised about possible ‘hidden political agendas’ of humanitarian aid from foreign countries.

Impact of civil society organizations on the political landscape became more sensitive:
- Their roles were marginalized during the period of martial law
- They became stronger in the emergency phase due to their local knowledge which incoming relief agencies relied on

Source: Author, Aleksius Jemadu
Description

#### Former GAM involvement in BRR

- Strategic reasons for former GAM to be involved in BRR:
  - To be able to take part in the biggest development in the early period after the tsunami and peace agreement
  - To be the entrance of former GAM to learn how to handle real socio-economic situations of Aceh
  - To be the entrance of building relationship with other countries/agencies
  - To also get the credit from the success of the reconstruction
  - To learn the government bureaucracy

#### Competition for economic resources

- Big resources of BRR has triggered competition of community groups, particularly in the project-level
- Security disruptions due to fragmented social and political groups have to be minimized

Source: Author, Aleksius Jemadu
GOING FORWARD, COMBINING SUCCESSFUL RECONSTRUCTION AND REINTEGRATION IS ESSENTIAL…

Description

Idea of merging the two streams

• **Coherent objective** of both reconstruction and reintegration, i.e., social welfare of Acehnese, makes it more sensible to be handled jointly
• **BRR** is regarded **successful** and has the **necessary capacity** to implement development programs. **BRA** is hoped to improve to achieve similar state

Establishment of Aceh Development Fund

• The effective **Multi Donor Funds** (MDF) was established for reconstruction purposes
• Donors would like to have its role **widened** as what-so-called the Aceh Development Funds to also include for **reintegration purposes**

Smooth transition to local government

• Emphasis on **capacity building** for local government in **transitioning BRR** programs to local-government control by May 2009
• **BRR** and local-government **Joint Secretariats** support provincial and district Recovery Forums for local coordination and knowledge transfer
• **Aceh Recovery Framework** is being developed to integrate **reconstruction and reintegration** projects of BRR, local government, central government, donors, local/national/international NGOs

Source: Author
...FOR THE SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT OF STABLE, PROSPEROUS, AND HEALTHY ACEH